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The progressive ageing of population in Europe heralds serious consequences in the years to come. 
Projections on the macroeconomic evolution in the next decades are pessimistic on the effects of 
population ageing: public health and social security expenditures will soar, and a severe shortage of 
workforce is expected
4. In Italy, however, ageing is already a big issue today. In addition to the  
trends of public expenditure and future workforce shortage, common to all EU member states, Italy 
will soon face the retirement of 2 million self-employed (nearly one half of  all the self-employed 
are – as of today – over 55), still active in traditional sectors like trades, crafts and agriculture, 
highly vulnerable to competition and exposed to old age problems, due to the insufficient coverage 
of the safety nets compared to those available to dependent workers. 
There are, however, reasons for concern also for those who are on regular payroll.  According 
to a common stereotype, end-of-career routes are thought to be “linear”, with smooth transitions 
from lifetime jobs to retirement. In this paper we challenge this view.  The “linear” paths are a 
prerogative  of  a  little  over  one  half  of  today’s  employees,  let  alone  those  of  tomorrow.  The 
remaining half are workers whose end-of-career is marked by irregular patterns of labour market 
activity that seriously hinder their current earnings and pensions. 
Explanations and policy implication will be addressed at the end of this paper. Our main aim 
is twofold: (i) supplement the debate on ageing on the basis of explorations of a longitudinal dataset 
of individual work histories from work to retirement,  (ii) provide an account of critical issues about 
elders’ working careers in Italy. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 we set up some background issues about 
ageing in Italy. In section 2 we compare the main stylized facts on the transition from work to 
retirement in Italy and Europe. The same are then reconsidered in the light of two rich longitudinal 
datasets of administrative source, covering the working careers of Italians workers between 1985 
and 1999. Section 3  presents some evidence about elders’ mobility in the Italian labour market. In 
section 4 we propose a classification of the typical paths towards retirement, analyze them along 
individual and job characteristics, and estimate their impact on the workers’ retirement earnings. 
Section 5 concludes with a  review of  policy implications. 
Ageing in Italy 
The process of population ageing currently underway in Italy is more pronounced than in most 
other European countries. After the baby boom of the 60s and early 70s, the total fertility rate has 
declined steeply: it fell below the replacement rate of 2.1 at the beginning of the 80s, reaching 1.24 
in 2000. At the same time, life expectancy is among the highest. Even though a slight recovery in 
fertility rates is expected in the coming years, the transition process to the new demographic regime 
will have a deep impact on the age structure
5. In the next two decades, the baby boom generations 
will reach retirement age, and will be replaced by new cohorts roughly half in size. By 2050, more 
than one in three Italians will be over the age of 65. 
An  additional  source  of  concern  in  Italy  is  the  participation  rates  of  the  elders.  Figure  1 
compares participation for people aged 55-64 in a selection of EU countries. Italy ranks 14
th out of 
16, and contrary to most countries participation has decreased throughout the Nineties. 
                                                 
4 On the budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations see the reports by the European Commission’s 
Economic Policy Committee (for instance European Commission - EPC, 2001 and 2003). On issues more related to the 
labour market see Oecd (2004) and ILO (2000). 
5 Here and in what follows we refer to the population projections produced by the Italian Statistical Office (Istat), 
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Source: Eurostat LFS 2002. 
Ageing and low participation of the elders, taken together, imply future scenarios in which the 
economic dependency rate – the ratio of people out of the labour force to those who participate – 
can become hardly sustainable. Oecd [2004] applied the participation rates measured in 2000 by 
gender and five-year age groups to the best available demographic projections, and predicted for 
Italy an economic dependency rate going from about 100% in 2000, to a record high of about 130% 
by 2050 (Oecd average from 60% to 75%). 
 
An impressive majority of Italian workers >55 are self-employed (46%, see Table 1. The EU-
25  average is only 13%). About 25% are public sector employees
6, and the remaining 29% work in 
the private sector. Of those of age below 55, over one half are employed in the private sector, the 
rest in roughly equal shares in the public sector and in self-employment. All these shares remain 
about constant in the decade 1993-2003. 
Table 1. Structure of employment by age, 1993-2003. 
    dependent in the 
public sector 
dependent in the 
private sector  self employed  total 
1993  ³ 55  25.2  29.0  45.9  4.241.789 
  < 55  26.1  50.9  23.0  20.174.158 
2003  ³ 55  24.7  29.2  46.0  4.802.060 
  < 55  22.0  54.6  23.6  21.860.576 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat Labour Force Sourvey, 1993 and 2003. 
Table 2. Distribution of private dependent employment by sector, 2003. 
  < 55  ³ 55 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  6.0  12.7 
Fishing  0.2  0.3 
Mining and quarrying  0.4  0.2 
Manufacturing  28.6  19.9 
Electricity, gas and water supply  1.0  0.9 
                                                 
6 Divisions 75, 80 and 85 of NACE rev. 1.1. Private businesses in Italy covers just 20% of total employment in 
the Education and Health sectors, so the divisions chosen roughly corresponds to public employment. Construction  10.8  12.7 
Wholesale and retail trade  20.2  23.3 
Hotels and restaurants  5.6  5.6 
Transport, storage and communications  6.8  6.3 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services  4.0  3.1 
Real estate, renting and business activities  10.0  8.5 
Other community, social and personal service activities  5.3  5.2 
Activities of households  1.1  1.3 
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies  0.1  0.1 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat Labour Force Survey, 2003. 
Within the private sector, elderly employees are concentrated in traditional activities (Table 
2). The share working in Agriculture is double with respect to the under 55. The share is higher also 
in Construction and in Trades, while it is lower elsewhere. 
 
Aging affects companies in different ways: young workers are heavily concentrated in the 
small-firm  sector,  while  mature  labour  force  is  concentrated  in  the  large  firms.  There  is  a 
physiological explanation of this: annual entry-exit rates for small firms are over 10%, and therefore 
life expectancy of such firms is shorter than that of large ones. For any person entering a small firm 
there is a high probability that he/she will be forced out of the job after a few years. The risk may be 
acceptable to a young person, much less so to a mature one, who may have strong incentives to hold 
to his/her post as long as possible, especially if employed in a large firm. 
The shift in the age distribution of employment is remarkable in all firm sizes: between 1988 
and 1998, the mode of the distribution among smaller firms shifts markedly from the 20-24 age-
group to the 25-29 age-group; among larger firms, from the 40-44 age-group to the 45-49 age-group 
(Figure 2). 
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Source: Our elaborations on Whip data, 1988 and 1998. 
 
Which  are  the  driving  forces  behind  this  evolution?  While  population  ageing  is  a  direct 
consequence of demography, workforce ageing does not depend only on demographics. Throughout 
the Eighties young cohorts entered the Italian labor market at the expense of elder cohorts that were 
displaced  out  of  the  labour  force  (the  so  called  “young-in,  old-out”  process
7).  Since  the  early 
Nineties,  however,  the  number  of  new  young  entrants  in  the  labor  market  has  been  steadily 
decreasing, and adult workers – the cohorts of the baby boom – have been ageing on the workplace. 
Events of the last twenty years have indeed contributed to reduce the number of workers over 60: 
voluntary  and/or  early  retirements  (generously  helped  at  the  expense  of  the  National  Social 
                                                 
7 B. Contini and F. Rapiti [1994 and 1999]. Security)  were  numerous,  and  collective  layoffs  from  large  companies,  aimed  at  perfectly able 
workers in their fifties, have been massive. They have not avoided, however, the rapid ageing of a 
large share of working population. Today in many of the large Italian companies the modal age of 
the workforce is around 45-48 years, a well known hump which will create huge problems  to 
productive capacity in the next decade. 
 
Two arguments deserve attention: 
(i)  in spite of the shrinkage of the post-baby boom cohorts and the increasing schooling 
attendance,  the  labor  supply  of  young  workers  would  have  allowed  a  much  larger 
generational replacement, which did not, however, take place. 
(ii)  the labor cost of retaining elderly workers on the job was high and increasing compared 
to hiring young people via work-and-training programs and other ad hoc instruments; 
 
The first argument is the supply-side of the story: from the Eighties onwards the shrinkage of 
younger cohorts has reached impressive proportions (the cohort of 15-year-olds numbered 972,000 
in 1980, and only 638,000 in 1996), in parallel with a physiologically robust increase in secondary 
and higher education. As a consequence participation rates in the age-group 15-24 years dropped 
from 43.5% in the 1980’s and early Nineties to 35.3% in 2003, much lower than the EU average. 
But participation itself was largely discouraged from the demand side.   
 
The second argument is demand related. Wage differentials between young and old have 
widened since the early Nineties as everywhere in Europe (higher returns to experience and human 
capital), and also as a consequence of programs aimed at enhancing labor market entry of young 
people. In 1985 gross pay of a youth <25 was about 71% that of a colleague >45; in 1996 the 
relative pay was down to 60%. And this underestimates the labor cost differential as it fails to 
account  for  the  generous  reduction  of  social  security  contributions  and  the  additional  built-in 
flexibility of all the new programs (Contini [2002]). Notice that the new contractual forms provided 
little incentives to the accumulation of human capital and company loyalty of the young workers. 
Very high hiring and firing rates were associated to the new entries. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
–  several  face-to-face  interviews  with  personnel  managers  strongly  suggest  so,  although  no 
statistical evidence is at hand – that since the Nineties firms may have opted for a reduction of hires 
of young entries and the retention of skilled and reliable older personnel in spite of the additional 
costs, thus delaying generational replacement, and enhancing the aging-on-the-job of their work 
force. 
 
Transitions work-pension in EU 
The aim of this section is to compare some stylized facts on the transition from dependent work to 
retirement in Italy and Europe, as they emerge from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), waves 1-7. 
In the Europanel questionnaire there are no explicit questions on the timing of retirement, nor 
is the retired condition well established. The individuals self declare their current status, one of 
which is “retired”, and  fill in questions on their current position which Eurostat uses to map the 
self-declaration into the ILO definition. ILO, however, does not distinguish those who are retired 
from other forms of inactivity
8. We identify the transition from work to retirement on the basis of 
the following conditions at year t: 
                                                 
8 Actually, the definition of “retired” is not always agreed upon.  Statistics Canada, after admitting that “the 
concept of retirement is ambiguous”, propose to define as retired “a person who is aged 55 and over, is not in the labour 
force  and  receives  50%  or  more  of  his  or  her  total  income  from  retirement-like  sources”.  See 
http://www.statcan.ca/english/concepts/definitions/retirement.htm. This definition does not fit with our purposes, since  
￿  The individual has had previous work experience; 
￿  The individual declares himself retired in year (t-1)  (retrospective question); 
￿  The individual declares himself retired at the time of the interview (t), and the ILO status 
is inactive; 
￿  At the time of the interview, the individual receives a retirement income. 
 
Table 2.1 is computed on a sub-sample of 7 countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, United Kingdom and Spain). All individuals aged 50-67 (in total 20,605) were selected from 
the first wave of Europanel (1994) and followed in the six waves.  Table 2 displays the distribution 
of the individuals by working status in 1999, once we distinguish the inactive into retired and other 
inactive according to the criteria specified above. The percentage of women still at work is low in 
Belgium, Italy and Spain; the share of working elders particularly high in Denmark. The majority of 
those who are out of the labour force receive a direct pension, but also in this case cross-country 
differences are sizeable.  The share of women without a direct pension is highest in Belgium, Italy 
and Spain. 
Table 2.1.  Distribution of individuals age 50-67 by working status, 1999, by country and sex (percent values). 
    Employed  Unemployed  Discouraged  Other inactive   Retired   Observations 
Belgium  f  9.4  0.6  0.2  35.6  54.3  862 
  m  26.1  0.4  0.2  10.5  62.7  682 
Denmark  f  33.3  1.2  1.0  20.6  44.0  627 
  m  42.8  1.3  0.8  7.4  47.7  555 
France  f  13.6  0.9  0.1  27.1  58.4  1453 
  m  21.6  0.7  0.1  9.6  68.1  1261 
Germany
1  f  20.6  1.4  –   24.9  52.9  1779 
  m  33.5  1.5  –  14.4  50.3  1539 
Italy  f  9.6  0.7  0.4  35.9  53.4  2557 
  m  25.5  1.6  0.5  9.5  62.9  2256 
Spain  f  10.1  1.2  0.2  56.4  32.1  2461 
  m  29.4  2.2  0.5  15.1  52.8  1975 
U.K.
2  f  20.0   –   –  16.9  63.1  1464 
  m  30.7   –   –  11.7  57.6  1134 
Source: European Community Household Panel, wave 6. 
Notes: 1) Discouraged status not available, included in the inactive status 2) Unemployed and discouraged statuses not 
available, included in the inactive status.   
The sample allows to observe the transitions towards retirement. In order to distinguish a 
“linear” transition – a long working spell directly followed by retirement, two variables can be used: 
(i) the calendar activity, which is lined up to reconstruct month by month the individual’s position; 
thus we observe whether the transition takes place directly from a working position or there are 
intervening spells of unemployment or inactivity; (ii) the retrospective question on the timing of 
their current job. 
Table 2.2 displays only the individuals for whom we observe both one or more spells in 
dependent work, and the transition to retirement. In order to observe a working career of at least 
three years, we considered only those retired after 1996.  Italy stands out with the highest frequency 
of direct transitions from work to retirement (almost 80%), largely due, however,  to the high share 
                                                                                                                                                                  
it rules out early retirements – in Italy retirements before 55, particularly for women, have been very common – and for 
individuals who happen to have non-labour earnings greater than the pension benefit. of employment-to-retirement transitions of public sector workers. In the private sector Italy is still 
high, but closer to other countries. 
Long  working  relationships  before  retirement  (>  10  years)  are  found  in  all  the  observed 
countries except the UK  (table 2.3). V-shaped distributions prevail everywhere except France. 
Table 2.2.  Direct transitions from employment to retirement, 1996-1999, by country and gender. 
    Direct transitions over total transitions 
    All  Only public  Only private 
Denmark  f  0.53  0.76  0.43 
  m  0.80  0.96  0.76 
France  f  0.55  0.67  0.49 
  m  0.54  0.66  0.53 
Germany  f  0.53  0.74  0.49 
  m  0.49  0.63  0.48 
Italy  f  0.78  0.93  0.64 
  m  0.79  0.91  0.73 
Spain  f  0.56  0.92  0.44 
  m  0.50  0.71  0.45 
U.K.  f  0.69  0.61  0.72 
  m  0.75  0.69  0.80 
Source: European Community Household Panel, waves 1-6. 
Note: Belgium excluded because of insufficient sample size. 
 
Table 2.3.  Distribution of retirement based on the length in years of the last working relationship, 1996-1999, 
by country and sex. 
  0-5  6-9  >10  Observations 
  all 
Denmark    11.0  7.3  81.8  110 
France  3.8  6.6  89.6  183 
Germany  16.9  6.8  76.2  336 
Italy  6.6  0.7  92.7  318 
Spain  15.5  3.4  81.2  149 
U.K.  25.4  16.3  58.4  166 
  only private sector 
Denmark  7.6  6.1  86.3  66 
France  6.3  11.3  82.5  97 
Germany  17.3  7.1  75.6  254 
Italy  8.7  1.0  90.3  195 
Spain  19.8  4.7  75.5  106 
U.K.  25.0  16.7  58.3  132 
Source: European Community Household Panel, waves 1-6. 
Note: Belgium excluded because of insufficient sample size. 
Mobility of the elders 
The Europanel, like most survey-based data, is not well suited track mobility in one’s job history, 
the problem being that most of the short employment spells remain unobserved.  Administrative based data are much more informative – in that they follow working careers on a monthly or even 
weekly basis – and point at substantial heterogeneity across individuals, geographical areas and 
industries  (see  Haltiwanger  1997;  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  1999;  Contini  2002;  Contini  and 
Trivellato  2005).  Italian  data  are  drawn  from  the  Work  Histories  Italian  Panel  (WHIP),  an 
administrative based longitudinal dataset that covers all private sector employment in Italy, 1985-
2001 
9. 
Mobility  indicators  strongly  depend  on  worker  age  and  firm  size.Young  workers  are, 
unsurprisingly, the most mobile, the search for a “good job” translating into many flows in and out 
of jobs. Worker flows are much higher in small firms for a variety of reasons: high entry and exit of 
small firms from the market place, limited internal mobility, few firing constraints due to looser 
institutional constraints and to the limited presence of unions. 
A rough, yet widely used synthetic indicator of mobility, is the Gross Worker Turnover (GWT, the 
ratio between engagements plus separations into/from a job, over the total number of workers).  
Figure 3 displays GWT as a function of worker age and firm size. Mobility as a function of age is 
U-shaped in all firm size classes. In small firms it is notably upward shifted compared to the large 
companies,  and  has  a  flatter  shape:  thus  the  “small  firm”  effect  dominates  the  age  factor  in 
determining  mobility. Notice,  for example,  that  individuals  50+  working  in  small  firms  (10-19 
employees)  have a 50% overall turnover, while individuals aged 25-29 employed in large firms 
(1000+)  slightly exceed 30%. 
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Source: Leombruni and Quaranta (2005). 
 
If the question is “do older workers have stable careers?”, the answer is twofold: in large 
firms they do, while in small firms they appear quite mobile. Should this be a cause for concern? 
High turnover is not necessarily bad news, provided that workers who get laid off can soon find a 
new job. Consider the time span required for re-entry into dependent employment following a 
separation.  If the re-entry time is sufficiently long, it is likely to reflect a period of social hardship – 
usually, although not necessarily unemployment – for the people involved.
10 
                                                 
9 For a description of the database see http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip. 
10 The WHIP database does not provide complete information on spells of non-employment.  There are three 
possibilities, in addition to unemployment without benefits (by far the most likely) – unemployment  with benefits 
being observable - (i) periods spent out of the labour force; (ii) temporary moves into self-employment; (iii) temporary 
moves in the public sector.  Moves into self-employment occur in less than 4% of all separations (see Contini and 
Fornero, 2002); temporary moves in the public sector are non-existent; temporary exit from the labor force at the end of 
a work career is plausible, but unlikely. Figure 4 shows the cumulated frequency of re-entry times for workers over 50 in large and 
small firms (over 200 and under 20 employees respectively). For individuals separated from large 
firms, the frequency of re-entry within 3 years is about 22%, two thirds of the time occurring as 
direct job-to-job switches (in less than 1 month): a hint at the fact that for such people re-entry is 
indeed a very rare event. In the small-firm sector things are quite different: re-entry occurs in almost 
50% of cases within 3 years, with direct job-to-job switches taking place at least 20% of the times. 
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Source: Our calculations based on WHIP data 
Paths to retirement 
In this section we challenge the prevailing view according to which the transition from work to 
retirement is often smooth and painless. The previous paragraph has already indicated that elders 
employed in small firms are quite mobile (recall that in Italy employment in the small-firm sector is 
much higher than the EU average, and that the share of over 50’s working in small firms hovers 
around 30% in the late Nineties).  
Transitions  to  retirement  are  best  observed  in  a  different  INPS  (Istituto  Nazionale  della 
Previdenza Sociale, the National Social Security Administration) datasource. The “Estratti Conto” 
(EC) archive summarizes the accrued contributions and benefits received by workers in the Italian 
private sector. In the following, we will presents statistics drawn from a random sample of 84.000 
individuals observed in the EC archive between 1985 and 1997 (the sampling ratio is about 1:365). 
The following spells are identifiable
11: 
 
1)  Dependent employment in private firms; 
2)  Self employment as artisans or in the trade sector; 
3)  Self employment in agriculture; 
4)  Wage compensation fund (CIG, Cassa Integrazione Guadagni); 
5)  Unemployment and “mobility lists” with relative benefits; 
6)  Pension; 
7)  Contributions to other funds (domestic help, voluntary deposits, INPS personnel, etc.). 
 
                                                 
11 The only workers who fall out of INPS scope are those employed in the public sector, and the self employed 
enrolled in specific professional registers (journalists, lawyers, accountants, work consultants and few others). We coded these episodes with a character, using “U” (“u”) to represent long (short) periods in 
which the individual falls out of the 7 categories above (see table 4). 
Short periods of absence from the EC archive (the “u”) can by and large be identified as 
unemployment spells without benefits, for the reasons given in previous section. Longer time spells 
(the  “U”)  may  correspond  both  to  long  unemployment  spells  (w/o  benefits),  or  to  periods  of 
inactivity. The latter occurs if a person decides to become inactive without being eligible for a 
seniority  pension,  and  waits  until  s/he  reaches  the  old  age  requirement.  We  cannot  distinguish 
between the two cases, but the latter is not infrequent for Italian women, who, having opted for 
household chores, withdraw at early age from the labour market and start to receive the old age 
pension at 55. 
The episodes identified by “M”, in contrast, are periods of unemployment with benefits. They 
comprise both ordinary unemployment benefits, and the benefits granted to people included in the 
so called mobility lists (liste di mobilità). The latter is a mixed scheme for individuals laid off from 
firms in “structural crisis”, that grants a rebate to firms who re-employ workers included in the list, 
and an unemployment benefit to the workers themselves. In some cases, the benefit is granted until 
the individual becomes eligible for retirement pension – the so called “long mobility” (mobilità 
lunga). 
Table 4. Career Path Codes 
 
(i)  Codes for Periods Considered 
D  Dependent work 
S  Self employment as artisans or in the trade sector 
M  Unemployment benefits and “mobility lists” benefits 
C  Wage compensation fund 
A  Self employment in agriculture 
P  Pension 
O  Other funds 
u  Unemployed for 3 – 12 months (w/o benefits) 
U  Unemployed for more than 12 months (w/o benefits) 
 
(ii)  The most common career paths 
Direct transitions from job to pension: 
      DP  Dependent work of ³7 years duration  --> pension 
  *DP  Anything --> dep. work --> pension 
Transitions from unemployment with benefits: 
  *DMP  Anything --> dep. work--> un. with benefits --> pension 
Transitions from unemployment without benefits: 
  *DuP  Anything --> dep. work --> short un. w/o benefits --> pension 
  *DUP  Anything --> dep. work --> long un. w/o benefits --> pension 
 *DMuP  Anything --> dep. work --> un. with benefits --> short un. w/o benefits --> pension 
*DMUP  Anything --> dep. work --> un. with benefits --> long un. w/o benefits --> pension 
 
 
A sequence of codes of observed episodes depicts a representation of the workers’ career 
during the years covered by the sample. For instance, an individual who had a single job spell and 
then retired would be classified as “DP”, while an individual who had two different jobs in a row, 
was then unemployed with benefits, and then had another job, would be classified as “DDMD”. A 
hint about the great heterogeneity in the career paths: out of 84.000 individuals in the sample, we 
counted about 9.000 different paths. 
In a next step we selected the individuals who went into retirement between the years 1992 
and 1997, and looked at their final 7 years before retirement. We kept only those who had at least 
one  dependent  job  over  the  7  years.  To  simplify  the  multitude  of  different  career  paths,  we considered just the last few episodes before retirement, masking with (*) anything that may have 
occured before. For instance, an individual with path “DuDDMP” would be coded as “*DMP”. We 
thus identify the 7 most common career paths, covering 97% of all the career paths of older workers 
(table 4-ii). It turns out that transitions through self employment, wage compensation fund and other 
funds were negligible. 
 
The  modal  path  is  indeed  the  most  linear  one:  41.4%  of  all  individuals  go  straight  into 
retirement after an uninterrupted working spell of at least 7 years (path “DP”, Table 5). Considering 
also transitions originating from shorter employment spells (path “*DP”), we get a total of about 
75% individuals going into retirement directly from a working spell
12. 
A notable 11.4% reach retirement after a period spent in unemployment with benefits, many 
through the “long mobility” scheme. If this is the case, the incentive provided to firms who re-
employ older workers in mobility lists looks quite ineffective at first sight.. 
About 11% reach retirement after a period of unemployment w/o benefits, 4.2% with a short 
unemployment  spell  between  job  and  pension  (path  “*DuP”).  Several  workers  transit  from 
dependent jobs to unemployment with benefits, then loose the eligibility and remain unemployed 
without benefits, and finally reach the pension. 
Differences by gender are substantial: 77.8% of men go into retirement directly from work, 
against 59.3% of women. The opposite holds for transitions from unemployment with and without 
benefits: 16.6% of women against 10.3% of men for the former;  20.1% of women against 8.9% of 
men for the latter. 
 
Table 6 displays the results by geographical area. In the North West and North East, direct 
transitions from job to pension are more frequent, while irregular patterns are more common in the 
Centre and even more in the South The contrast between the rich North West and the South is 
sharp. In the former, half of the labour force reach the pension via the most stable path, and only 
7.5% arrive after a period of unemployment without benefit. In the South these percentages are 
29.1% and 18.6% respectively. 
Table 5. Different paths towards retirement by gender (retired 1992 -1997) 
  Total  Women  Men 
Direct transitions from job to pension  74.6  59.3  77.8 
DP  41.4  35.6  42.7 
*DP  33.2  23.7  35.1 
Transitions from unemployment with 
benefits (*DMP)  11.4  16.6  10.3 
Transitions from unemployment without 
benefits  10.9  20.1  8.9 
*DuP  4.2  6.3  3.8 
*DUP  3.9  8.2  3 
*DMuP  1.3  2.6  1 
*DMUP  1.5  3  1.1 
Others  3.1  4.1  2.9 
Source: Our calculations based on Inps data. 
                                                 
12 This figure is coherent with those reported in table 2.2 from Europanel, with similar differences by gender.  Table 6. Different paths towards retirement by area (retired 1992-1997) 
  North West  North East  Center  South  
Direct transitions from job to pension  80.1  77.6  72  58.4 
DP  49.1  38.8  38.5  29.1 
*DP  31.0  38.8  33.5  29.3 
Transitions from unemployment with 
benefits (*DMP)  10.3  8.2  12.1  18.6 
Transitions from unemployment without 
benefits  7.5  10.4  12.7  18.6 
*DuP  3.4  4.9  3.2  7.1 
*DUP  2.4  3.0  5.8  6.9 
*DMuP  1.0  0.9  1.6  2.0 
*DMUP  0.7  1.6  2.1  2.6 
Others  2.1  3.8  3.3  4.3 
Source: Our calculations based on “Estratti Conto” data. 
Do different career paths lead to different fortunes in terms of individual earnings? In order to 
answer we slightly reshuffle the path types defined above. Specifically, we disaggregate the path 
“*DP” into those who had multiple, contiguous job spells and those who had multiple job spells 
with  intervening  unemployment  periods.  This  is  because  unemployment  periods  may  have  a 
negative impact on the wage change associated to the job change, and on the pension benefit, via a 
lower accrued seniority. Next, we regroup those who arrive from an unemployment spell without 
benefits (previous “*DuP”, “*DUP”, “*DMuP”, “*DMUP”)
13. These are by and large the most 
fragmented careers, and can conveniently be considered collectively. 
In table 7 the yearly real wage in one’s last position and his/her initial pension are reported 
(all  before  taxes).  Not  surprisingly,  the  career  type  with  a  single  job  spell  before  retirement 
dominates all other paths with respect to both wage and initial pension. Here we find all workers 
who have had a stable working career and are completely sheltered by the time they retire. Next 
come those who had multiple job spells, but no intervening unemployment periods. Among those 
with  a  direct  transition  from  work  to  retirement,  workers  who  had  multiple  job  spells  and 
intervening unemployment periods are in a worse position.. The median worker has yearly wage 
and  initial  pension  of  about  17,000  and  10,200  euros  respectively,  compared  with  24,200  and 
15,500 euros for the “stable” ones. 
Consider now the transitions from work to retirement, with an intervening spell in mobility 
lists. The mobility spell reduces the last wage (this may hide a selection effect: the probability of 
being placed in mobility is higher for manual workers who earn less than their white- collar peers), 
and  consequently  also  the  initial  pension,  although  –  it  is  worth  reminding  –  periods  spent  in 
mobility lists add to seniority as during active employment. 
The least fortunates are people who have experienced unemployment spells without benefits 
and/or periods out of the labor force before reaching retirement. Within this group the variability is 
higher than elsewhere – see the 90/10 percentiles ratio of both last pay and pension. The (not many) 
workers  who  spend  some  periods  in  self-employement  and/or  in  professional  activities  before 
retirement are in this group. The median is about the same as of those who transit from disjointed 
multiple jobs to pension. The last wage is similar (16,600 versus 17,000 euros), the initial pension is 
                                                 
13 In order to take out from the last group the inactive – those who voluntarily retired before being eligible for a 
seniority pension – we selected out the career paths where the non-working spell between last job and pension is longer 
than three years. even lower. On average, these workers experienced longer unemployment periods without accruing 
social security contributions, witness a replacement rate of 56%, way below the previous groups. 
Note that those arriving from unemployment with benefits are slightly below 62%. 
It is worth noting the progressivity of retirement treatment vs. earned income: within all career 
paths the replacement ratios are strictly decreasing with earnings. If the accrued pension benefits 
fall below the legal minimum (at the bottom of the distribution), a guaranteed minimum pension is 
paid, and the replacement rate can be higher than 100%. At the top of the distribution, the old 
PAYG  system  included  a  progressive  cut  in  the  calculation  rate  applied  to  yearly  wages  over 
(about) 30.000 euros. This provides a remarkable redistributive effect in individual earnings. A 
simple inequality measure on pension earnings – the 90/10 percentile ratio reported in last column – 
is always lower than the same ratio on wages. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of earnings by career paths (retired 1992-1997) 
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Source: Our calculations based on Whip data. 
Note: Columns with heading Pi-Pj contain the average earnings between percentiles Pi and Pj. 
Econometric estimation 
To  conclude  our  exploration,  we  present  the  results  of  a  simple  OLS  regression  of  the  initial 
pension (= initial yearly pension after retirement in 1999 EU) against a set of covariates that control 
for individual and job characteristics (previous to retirement), as well as career features before 
retirement,  i.e.  time  spent  in  mobility  lists,  unemployment  spells,  number  of  job  changes.  We account  for  the  different  paths  from  work  to  retirement  described  above  by  means  of  a  set  of 
dummy variables. Data on cumulated lifetime seniority are not available: this omission is the cause 
of upward bias of the impact of the covariates that embody the effect of seniority, namely gender, 
skill level and firm size. As regards gender and skill level, it is usually the case that women’s 
lifetime seniority is shorter than male’s, and that managers’ is longer than manual workers’. As to 
firm size, seniority in large firms is likely to be longer than in small firms due to the higher risk of 
closeout or exit from the market place of the latter.  
Panel 1 shows the results of OLS estimation. All the covariates are highly significant, and the 
coefficient sign and magnitude are in line with a priori expectations.  In summary: 
    
(i)  the marginal contribution of the final yearly wage earned before retirement is about EU 200 
of  extra  yearly  pension  per  1000  EU  of  pay  (about  2/3  the  amount  of  social  security 
contributions due on that pay); 
(ii)  each unemployment spell (and/or period spent out of the labor force) has a negative impact 
on pensions: about  EU 25 per month of inactivity; 
(iii)  if the unemployment spell is covered by social security benefits, the compensation of the 
negative impact sub (ii) is complete (EU 24.8 per month); 
(iv)  women’s pensions are – ceteris paribus – EU 3,729 lower than men, reflecting the shorter 
lifetime seniority that women, on average, achieve during their working life; 
(v)  firm size and industry matter too, in addition to their direct impact through the final wage 
(wages  increase  with  firm  size,  and  some  industries  pay  better  than  others):  a  career 
termination in a small firm (< 20 employees) leads to a 1,363 EU cut in yearly pension 
against the size benchmark, vs. a net addition of  EU 702 for those who leave a large firm (> 
1000).  Likewise a worker who spent her/his life in the banking industry will receive EU 
2,849 more than the industry benchmark (food and textiles), while people coming from the 
personal service sector will be worse off by EU 455. As explained above, these results may 
be biased due to the omission of lifetime seniority; 
(vi)  there is a substantial premium also to skill level. Here too, a higher level in the hierarchy is 
usually associated with longer seniority and higher employability: the white collars’ extra 
annual pension is 3,518 EU over the manual workers’; the high executives’ EU 16,109 
higher; 
(vii)  a direct “smooth” transition from a long lasting working relationship to retirement is our 
benchmark  path.  Multiple  job  changes  before  retirement  (“contiguousJobs”)  have  a 
modest impact on the amount of  yearly pension (- 346 EU). Ceteris paribus, paths with a 
mobility spell between work and retirement (“unempWITH-Benefits”) lead to a pension cut of 
EU 1,211 / year.  Path types “unempWITHOUT-Benefits” lead to a lower pension cut, only 989 
EU, surprising only at first sight as this group is highly heterogeneous: it includes careers 
interrupted  by  periods  spent  out  of  the  labor  force  (possibly  of  women  who  opt  for 
household activities), as well as careers of successful professionals who fall outside INPS 
coverage.  
  
Panel 1. Regression results 
 
Dependent:   real yearly gross pension, values in 1999 euros 
Observations:  7544 
R-Square:   0.649 
Adj R-Sq:   0.647 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
                        DF   Sum of Squares    Mean Square          F    Pr > F 
Model                   32      3.258586E11    10183080777     433.11    <.0001 
Error                 7508      1.765262E11       23511751 
Corrected Total       7540      5.023848E11 
 
Parameter Estimates: 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  s.e.  t-value  Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept  -40137.0  9008.1  -4.46  <.0001 
last_yearly_wage  0.2  0.004  50.98  <.0001 
last_yearly_wage_2  -3.3E-07  8.7E-09  -37.84  <.0001 
 
age  1998.4  316.4  6.32  <.0001 
age_2  -19.4  2.8  -6.99  <.0001 
woman  -3729.2  145.5  -25.63  <.0001 
whiteCollars  3518.5  140.1  25.11  <.0001 
executives  16109.0  646.3  24.92  <.0001 
 
North-West  330.7  159.0  2.08  0.0376 
North-East  -296.9  179.2  -1.66  0.0976 
South  -1152.7  204.6  -5.63  <.0001 
Islands  -743.0  274.6  -2.71  0.0068 
 
size_1-9  -1363.5  175.8  -7.76  <.0001 
size_10-19  -814.6  210.9  -3.86  0.0001 
size_200-999  502.4  170.5  2.95  0.0032 
size_1000-  702.7  161.9  4.34  <.0001 
settore0  -839.2  599.2  -1.40  0.1614 
settore1  2760.1  651.3  4.24  <.0001 
settore2  -304.2  212.7  -1.43  0.1526 
settore3  6.2  172.1  0.04  0.9711 
settore5  110.1  228.3  0.48  0.6296 
settore6  -604.5  211.8  -2.85  0.0043 
settore7  943.8  294.3  3.21  0.0013 
settore8  2849.8  248.5  11.47  <.0001 
settore9  -455.6  255.8  -1.78  0.0749 
 
howManyJobs  -52.0  53.7  -0.97  0.3322 
monthsNotWorking  -25.2  3.8  -6.66  <.0001 
monthsWithBenefits  24.8  4.0  6.27  <.0001 
 
career paths dummies 
contiguousJobs  -346.2  189.5  -1.83  0.0678 
disjointedJobs  -1549.9  272.9  -5.68  <.0001 
unempWITH-Benefits  -1211.5  202.6  -5.98  <.0001 
unempWITHOUT-Benefits  -989.2  215.5  -4.59  <.0001 
others  -1954.1  376.5  -5.19  <.0001 
 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In this paper we show a two-sided picture of the transitions from work to retirement in the last 
decade. On one side, we have many workers who have linear working careers and are completely 
sheltered by the time they retire: all dependent workers in the public sector, and roughly half of the 
ones in the private sector. The representative individual of latter group is a male employed in a large 
firm of Northern Italy, regardless of skill level. Should he face a layoff, his chances of rapid re-
entry in the labour market are not high, but the safety net of (long term) unemployment benefits 
schemes are effective in reducing the large negative impact on their future pension earnings. Both 
the solid career type of this group, and the remarkable generosity of the social security net, point to 
the possibility of  flexibilization of retirement age as an answer to the issues posed by ageing. 
The other side of the story however is quite different. About 40% of dependent workers in the 
private sector (60% in the South of Italy), typically employed in small-medium firms, have careers 
marked by irregular patterns of labour market activity. Measuring how different career types impact 
on their wages and pensions yields unequivocal results. While the median last wage of individuals 
who  directly  transit  from  a  long  lasting  dependent  job  to  pension  (46%  of  cases)  was  24,200 
EU/year in 1999, and the pension 15,000 EU, the same figures for the two paths identified as most 
fragmented (21% of cases) amount to about 17,000 EU and 10,000 EU respectively.
14 
  
The  case  for  flexibilization  of  retirement  has  been  strongly  advocated  by  experts  and 
institutions on equity and efficiency grounds. The extension of working life will reduce pressure on 
both social security systems and shortage of workforce. The real challenge is social cohesion that 
may be at risk in the not-too-distant future in many countries of the European Union: the extension 
of working life is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition in order to face the challenge, but a 
wide range of measures is required to ease the transition from work to retirement. We agree with 
this view. The Italian tale of bumpy end-of-career routes (but is it only Italian?) suggests that the 
costs – private and social – of such profiles can be high. Which implies that measures aimed  at 
easing the transition are all the more important, the higher the frequency of fragmentation near the 
end of one’s working life. 
What  would  be  the  welfare-efficiency  consequences  of  raising  employment  levels  among 
older workers? Considering the health and educational status of past and, to a lesser extent, current 
retiree cohorts, there was indeed a rationale behind early retirement provisions. But this case is 
rapidly vanishing as the evidence of rapid gains in health status is becoming clear: realistically 
speaking, an average 55 years old male could, without physical hardship, continue to work for 
another 10 to 15 years.
15 
On the education side, the story is similar. The education gap (and also the difference in 
cognitive abilities) between those who today are 60, compared to those who are 45, is huge. But, 
this gap will close once contemporary older workers exit the labour market: there are no noticeable 
skill  or  cognitive  differentials  between  today’s  45-year  olds  and  30-year  olds.  This  is  of  vital 
importance on the ‘efficiency’ side of the coin because it is well-known that the productivity of 
older  workers  depends on  retraining  and  skill-upgrading  before  they  reach  their  50s.  And  it  is 
equally well known that such investments in training are only effective if workers already possess a 
strong educational and cognitive basis. 
 
G. Esping-Andersen (2001) has convincingly argued that in order to implement a European 
strategy of flexibilization of retirement a number of basic parameters must be agreed upon a-priori. 
Firstly, it must be premised on positive actuarial incentives to delay retirement for those who so 
                                                 
14 These may include also (few) individuals who voluntarily choose a more erratic labour market participation. 
15  Jacobzone et.al. (1998) show that French men, at age 65, can now expect 10 additional years free of moderate 
disabilities; German men, a full 12 years. Moreover, the trend is strongly positive, meaning that future 65-year olds will 
be able to count on far more disability-free years. may wish without penalizing workers who need to, or desire, early withdrawal. Secondly, it must 
take into consideration the much more insecure careers and life course of younger cohorts today. 
Unlike their fathers, young workers today cannot count on a steady, well-paid job for life. Low-
skilled  workers,  according  to  OECD  (1998)  estimates,  are  likely  to  experience  6-8  years  in 
unemployment. Thirdly, although current pension benefits may occasionally be overly generous in 
light of retirees’ resource strength, this will not necessarily be the case 30 years hence. Therefore a 
major reduction of replacement rates should not be on the agenda, as it  could prove seriously 
counter-productive in welfare (and incentive) terms. 
In  addition  to  these  problems,  Italy  must  take  action  also  on  the  excessive  labor  cost  of 
retaining older cohorts vis-à-vis the younger ones. A non-marginal reduction of social security 
contributions  for  the  50+  is  necessary  in  order,  at  the  very  least,  to  equalize  the  fiscal  wedge 
between younger and older generations.      
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